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SUPREME COURT 
L.A. Powe, Jr.* 
Roe v. Wade has done more than legalize abortions and be-
come a talisman for the ideological packing of the federal judiciary. 
It has resulted in the death of tree after tree, all in the cause of more 
and better constitutional theory. Whatever the initial interest, over 
time the outpouring has grown very stale. Thus when Laurence 
Tribe's new book, Constitutional Choices, devoted its preface and 
first two chapters to blasting theory, my heart grew warm. Maybe 
more constitutional writing will turn away from jurisprudence and 
back to reality. A nice starting point might be the facts of the cases, 
because it is the facts-reality, if you will-that give constitutional 
law its force. 
As a small contribution, I wish to discuss two recent and ob-
scure decisions: Energy Reserves Group (ERG) v. Kansas Power & 
Light (KPL)t and Hawaiian Housing Authority v. Midkijf.2 Both 
decisions were unanimous, bringing together Justices Brennan and 
Rehnquist and everyone in between. This perhaps helps to explain 
their obscurity. Unanimous decisions are unlikely to have either 
the factual or legal complexity of most of the Court's work. Or so 
we may think. But in each of these cases the opinion contains a tell-
tale sign that something was amiss. When the Court offers such 
hints, we ought to take a close look at what is happening. 
ERG contains the following sentence: "Although prices in the 
intrastate market have diverged somewhat from those in the inter-
state market due to the recent shortage of natural gas, the regula-
tion of interstate prices effectively limits intrastate price increases."3 
• Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor of Law, The University of Texas. 
I. 459 U.S. 400 (1983). (Justice Powell wrote a two paragraph concurring opinion 
joined by the Chief and Justice Rehnquist to indicate that one section of the Court's opinion 
was unnecessary to the judgment and that he would leave that problem for another day. All 
three joined the parts of ERG that I will discuss.) I should add that I was losing counsel on a 
petition for certiorari in Mesa Petroleum v. KPL, 455 U.S. 928 (1982), a case presenting an 
identical federal statutory issue to the one in ERG. The statutory issue is not pertinent here. 
Mesa lacked the constitutional issue. 
2. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984). (Justice Marshall did not participate.) 
3. ERG, 459 U.S. at 414. 
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When the Justices conclude that artificially holding down the price 
in one market will, during shortages, also hold down the price in a 
free market, then the reader suspects that the Court is going to 
commit ignorance-maybe worse. 
In Midkiff the sign was less obvious: instead of identifying the 
plaintiff, the Court simply referred to "appellees" without further 
description.4 Because most cases have real plaintiffs, it is worth 
looking in the briefs or the opinions below to find out who they are. 
What you discover may surprise you. 
I 
After Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 
(NGPA), Kansas accepted a statutory invitation to slap price con-
trols on sales of intrastate gas in circumstances where the price 
would otherwise escalate because of the NGPA. KPL and ERG 
had negotiated a contract in 1975 containing escalation clauses that 
were triggered by the NGPA. The Kansas statute thus blocked a 
previously agreed-upon price increase. 
The Court easily sustained the Kansas statute against a con-
tract clause challenge. The Justices saw no substantial impairment 
of the parties' contractual obligations. First, the Court found that 
Kansas was not adopting "special interest" legislation because the 
statute affected the natural gas industry generally, not just one or 
two firms. Further, the Kansas statute was prompted by "signifi-
cant and legitimate state interests": the need to protect consumers 
from rapidly rising natural gas prices "caused" by congressional de-
regulation.s Second, and more important, there was no disruption 
of expectations since no one in the industry could have anticipated 
federal deregulation. 6 
The key to ERG is the Court's conclusion that the price in-
crease called for by the contract would create "unforeseen windfall 
profits."? How does application of a contract create a "windfall"? 
The Court did not think to ask. Nor did it examine the purpose of 
the price escalation clause. If one searches for answers to these 
questions the case becomes more interesting-and also more 
difficult. 
Natural gas contracts are "long-term," often for the life of the 
4. Even the style of the three consolidated cases gives no hint who the plaintiff-appel-
lees are. All three are "v. Frank E. Midkiff et al." Midkiff, supra note 2. 
5. ERG, 459 U.S. at 416-18 & n.25. This flows from Allied Structural Steel v. Span-
naus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
6. ERG, 459 U.S. at 415-16. This criterion comes from the other recent contract 
clause decision, United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I (1977). 
7. ERG, 459 U.S. at 412. 
1986] ECONOMIC MAKE-BELIEVE 387 
welLs Producers like Energy Reserves Group must have continu-
ous production to maintain their leases and need an income stream 
to meet financial commitments attendant to drilling. Purchasers 
like Kansas Power & Light need to cover the cost of any necessary 
pipeline construction as well as know there will be consistent sup-
plies so that they do not lack energy at a crucial time. Yet in infla-
tionary times no producer wants to agree to a long-term, specific, 
fixed price.9 Hence natural gas contracts contain escalation clauses 
to cover the eventualities that will almost undoubtedly occur during 
a long-term relationship.IO 
The contract in ERG fit this pattern perfectly. KPL wanted a 
life-of-the-field contract! I and yet it offered less money than others 
for ERG's gas.12 ERG's need, however, was for inflation hedges 
during a time of rapidly increasing prices. The result of the difficult 
arms length bargainingB was that KPL got its life-of-the-field pro-
vision as well as lower initial prices. But in turn KPL yielded two 
price escalators to ERG.I4 
The function of a price escalator clause is to provide for price 
8. "One of the cardinal principles of a gas sales contract is that it must be 'long 
term.'" Johnson, Natural Gas Sales Contracts, 34 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 83, 95 
(1983). But most such contracts terminate automatically if production in paying quantities 
ceases. 
9. Of course the initial price could be set quite high in order to allow for future infla-
tion. In the 1950's prices were higher for long term contracts, but contracts with escalators 
had significantly lower prices than those without them. P. MACAVOY, PRICE FORMATION IN 
NATURAL GAS FIELDS 237 (1962). 
I 0. See Cassin, Gas Purchase Contracts-Enticing a Shy Genie from an Invisible Lamp, 
25 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 27 (1974); Crump, Natural Gas Price Escalation Clauses: 
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 70 MINN. L. REv. 61, 63-68 (1985). Between 1961 and 1978 
indefinite price escalation clauses were prohibited in contracts subject to Federal Power Com-
mission (and then Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) jurisdiction, that is interstate 
contracts. "Even these contracts, however, frequently contained a 'deregulation clause,' 
which provided for the operation of an indefinite pricing clause should the gas covered by the 
contract ever be deregulated." Johnson, supra note 8, at 94 & n.52 (1983). 
II. KPL's Executive Vice President testified in November, 1975 before the Kansas Cor-
poration Commission that the contracts "certainly" were "the result of arm's length negotia-
tions." A life-of-the-field contract was "necessary to meet the demands of (KPL's] present 
customers." Reproduced in Appendix to Appellant's Reply Brief at 9a, ERG, supra note I. 
12. Appellant's Brief at 3-4, ERG, supra note I. 
13. KPL's Executive President testified that the negotiations were "the longest and 
most complicated of anything we have ever been involved in.'' Testimony, supra note II at 
3a. 
14. In response to the question whether the escalator clauses were a quid pro quo for 
the life of the field clause, KPL's Executive Vice President stated: "That's correct. I think 
that is a distinct advantage to both parties is this situation and certainly one that was consid-
ered in the negotiations." Testimony, supra note II, at 9a. This is hardly uncommon. Par-
ties often trade future price increases for the elimination or addition of certain contract 
clauses and these trades are "as much a part of the total consideration" as the initial contract 
price. E. NEUNER, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN 
FIELD MARKETS 266-69 (I 960). 
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increases should a specified event occur. The event that occurred in 
ERG was deregulation. By 1975, when the contract was drafted, 
producers were certain that the Natural Gas Act of 1938 could not 
last. One possibility was that Congress would apply price controls 
to intrastate gas, Is thereby removing the incentive of producers to 
avoid federal control by selling intrastate.I6 The other possible 
change was in the opposite direction--deregulation of interstate 
prices.11 Apparently the members of the United States Supreme 
Court could not see that their ever-tightening regulatory holdings, Is 
when combined with shortagesi9 and a decrease in the available 
reserves of natural gas,2o would produce a fundamental change in 
the Natural Gas Act-with a strong possibility of deregulation. 
Not everyone was equally ignorant.2I The clause in the ERG-KPL 
contract was inserted precisely because ERG foresaw the possibility 
of deregulation. The Court's statement about what the parties 
could anticipate was flatly wrong.22 Needless to add, no citation to 
the record accompanied it. 
Still, the Court offered the consolation that the statute was not 
15. Cassin, supra note 10, at 59. In a section entitled "The Prospect for Deregulation," 
Cassin notes that bills extending federal regulation of intrastate gas had been introduced in 
Congress. 
16. Since intrastate prices were not regulated and interstate prices were, newly discov-
ered gas remained in the intrastate market thereby exacerbating the reserves problem for 
consumer states. See Braeutigam, The Deregulation of Natural Gas, in CASE STUDIES IN 
REGULATION: REGULATION AND REFORM 142, 156 (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1981). 
17. Amazingly, the NGPA combined both features. The Senate bill had looked to de-
regulation, the House bill to tighten regulation. The Conference Committee pasted the two 
together. Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title I, 59 TEx. L. REV. 
101 (1980). 
18. See H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL, & C. MEYERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
LAW OF OIL AND GAS 42-59 (4th ed. 1979). 
19. Crump, supra note 10, at 63: "During the 1970's, when natural gas shortages pro-
duced layoffs, plant closings, hardships, and even deaths, it became clear to all informed 
observers that the market price of gas would rise." (Footnotes omitted.) 
20. See Table I in MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, !9 NAT. RES. J. 811, 
816 ( 1979) (gas reserves falling every year after 1970). 
21. As early as 1970 the Fifth Circuit had concluded that Federal Power Commission 
pricing policy, constrained by decision after decision of the Supreme Court, was "whistling in 
the dark." Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases v. Federal Power Commission, 428 F.2d 
407, 415-18, 444 (5th Cir. 1970). 
22. Watson, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and Gas Purchase Contracts, 27B 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1407, 1418-21 (1982) (discussing the evolution of area rate esca-
lators). When I was preparing the certiorari petition for Mesa, supra note I, Mesa's local 
counsel told me that he could tell when a contract was drafted by the types of clauses that 
appeared in it, and that by the mid-70's producers could see the possibility of deregulation. 
For an interesting confirmation, see M. LAIRD, ENERGY-A CRISIS IN PUBLICI POLICY 6 
(1977): "[B]ecause natural gas deregulation legislation has narrowly failed in Congress in the 
last two years, producers have probably been watching Washington more carefully than their 
geological studies in deciding when and where to explore for new supplies." See also note 10 
supra. 
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"special interest" legislation. Its reach included all producers in 
Kansas who sold their gas in the local market. Presumably these 
producers can hold their own in the legislature against those Kan-
sans who would complain about high electric bills during a time of 
spiralling inflation. Whether the statute worked to hold consumer 
bills down significantly may be problematical; that it took from the 
producers to give to the consumers is not. 
II 
As readers of James Michener's Hawaii are aware, prior to 
American acquisition Hawaii had developed a feudal land owner-
ship system which has proven remarkably resistant to change. The 
largest eighteen landholders (each with holdings of over 21,000 
acres) in the state own 40% of the land. The seventy-two largest 
landowners own 47%, and since the state and federal governments 
own 49%, little is left for the rest of the population. On Oahu, 
where the vast majority of the state's people live, the twenty-two 
largest landowners control 72.5% of all private land.23 
In order to break up this feudal pattern, the state legislature 
passed the Land Reform Act of 1967. The act created a statutory 
mechanism for condemning residential tracts at the behest of the 
homeowner-lessee and transferring the fee title to the lessee, with 
compensation to the former owner. This, said the Supreme Court, 
would end an oligopoly the state legislature had decided was "re-
sponsible for skewing the State's residential fee simple market, in-
flating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and 
welfare. "24 The Bishop Estate, on whose behalf the Land Reform 
Act was challenged, was the biggest landowner of all, owning 22% 
of all private land on Oahu.2s 
The fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit taking of private 
property for public purposes without just compensation; and the 
Court has held that they implicitly prohibit any governmental tak-
ing of private land for a private purpose. The legal issue in Midkiff 
was whether Hawaii's use of condemnation on behalf of private par-
ties was a "private" use and therefore unconstitutional despite the 
statutory provision for compensation. The issue was neither novel 
nor unsettled. In 1954 Berman v. Parker26 had upheld urban re-
23. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2325; the Hou Hawaiians and Maui Loa, Chief of the Hou 
Hawaiians Amicus Brief at 32-33; Queen Liliuokalani Trust, King Lunalilo Trust, Alu Like, 
Inc. and Association of Hawaii Civic Clubs Amicus Brief at 19. 
24. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2325. 
25. Brief for Appellants, Jurisdictional Statement at I, Midkiff, supra note 2. 
26. 348 u.s. 26 (1954). 
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newal in the District of Columbia against a similar attack. In 
Berman the government was trying to eradicate slums; in Midkiff it 
had the equally noble-sounding purpose of eradicating feudalism. 
Predictably, the Court unanimously held that condemning private 
land under the Land Reform Act was not a "purely private taking" 
and "not to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals. "27 
The quoted language resembles ERG's conclusion that no spe-
cial interest legislation was involved. But all Kansans use natural 
gas in one way or another, while not all the citizens of Hawaii were 
beneficiaries of the land redistribution plan. By the very terms of 
the act, Midkiff involved homeowners who wished to be landown-
ers, or in other words only those who could afford to buy a house in 
what all admit is a tight and expensive market. They may not be "a 
particular class of individuals," but the Islands' underprivileged 
they are not. In fact they are the middle class whites and Japanese 
who dominate Hawaiian politics. Midkiff consisted of three consol-
idated cases and the landowners specifically involved came from an 
area of Eastern Honolulu where according to census figures the av-
erage household income was a whopping $42,000.28 
So it looks like a fair fight. The middle class against Hawaii's 
elite, the five families: Alexanders, Baldwins, Castles, Cookes, and 
Davies. If the former rulers lose to the newcomers, that's politics. 
It does not look like a case for judicial intervention. 
But our tidy legal pigeonholes conceal important complexities. 
As I mentioned, and the Court did not, the plaintiffs were suing on 
behalf of the Bishop Estate. Bernice Pauahi Bishop, the last lineal 
descendant of King Kamehameha the Great, established the Bishop 
Estate in her will. The Estate is preserved as a perpetual educa-
tional trust for the support of descendants of the original 
Hawaiians. The income of the Bishop Estate comes from but 3% of 
the land it holds, the remainder having no current commercial 
value.29 
That the 175,000 citizens of Hawaiin ancestry could use help 
jumps out from any look at the pertinent statistics.3o The median 
income from Chinese households is over $21,000. For both whites 
and Japanese it is over $19,000. For those with some Hawaiian an-
cestry it is $13,000 and for pure Hawaiians it's under $9,300. Not 
surprisingly, behind these figures are others showing that Hawaiian 
27. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2331. 
28. Queen Liliuokalani Trust Amicus Brief, supra note 23, at 17. 
29. /d. at 5. Two-thirds of the income producing property is in residential leases; the 
rest is leased to commercial establishments. 
30. Office of Hawaiian Affairs Amicus Brief at I 8, 20. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs is 
a government agency created by the state constitution. Its brief supported the Bishop Estate. 
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employment is overwhelmingly blue collar; fewer than half gradu-
ate from high school and less than 5% from college; and their life 
expectancy is the lowest of any group in the Islands. The Bishop 
Estate may not have been helping much, but it was at least trying to 
help where help was most needed. 
In this context, the Land Reform Act of 1967 turns out to be a 
statute well-suited for Footnote Four analysis, inasmuch as it takes 
from those who have least and gives to those who have most. Not 
so, argue those supporting the law, who portray it as a general law, 
applicable to all large landowners, not only the Bishop Estate. 
Beneficiaries of the law include the less wealthy as well as the afflu-
ent. And-most significantly-the Bishop Estate, like others whose 
land is taken, will receive just compensation. 
The claim of general applicability is true and indeed the strong-
est part of the case. The Land Reform Act does apply to all large 
landowners. Yet what fueled the land reform was the residential 
leasing in Honolulu. The Bishop Estate was the only great land-
owner involved in that leasing. Some smaller landowners were also 
involved, but they did not fight; only the Bishop Estate did. The 
Kahala lessees attempted to deflect notice from the rather hand-
some incomes in Eastern Honolulu where they reside by noting that 
one of the three cases before the Court-the named case in fact-
involved the Bishop Estate's holdings in Western Honolulu where 
the mean household income "was only $23,332."31 A far cry below 
Kahala. But a far cry above the largely landless native Hawaiians. 
This leaves us with the issue of compensation. Since the Estate 
will get "just compensation," the casual observer may suppose it 
will be no worse off than if it still owned the land and received 
ground rents monthly. But then why did the Estate enrich so many 
local and mainland lawyers on the way to defeat in the Supreme 
Court? 
The easiest way to answer this question is by posing a variant 
of the contingent fee question we put to students and colleagues: 
which side would you want to take on a contingent fee basis? Here 
the question is which would you rather have: (1) the right to a 
monthly ground rent in perpetuity where the rent is renegotiated 
every few decades to reflect changes in market value or (2) the cur-
rent value of the fee remainder at the end of its current long term 
lease (negotiated in the 1940's and 1950's and reflecting then pre-
vailing market values)-as determined by a judge and jury? In an-
swering this question, bear in mind that the Hawaiian judiciary is 
31. Appellant's Reply Brief at 16 n.16, Kahala Community Association v. Midkiff, 104 
S. Ct. 2321 (1984). 
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one of the most politicized in America. Consider also that few if 
any native Hawaiians will be on the jury; indeed, the jury is likely to 
be composed of people drawn from the same middle class as the 
condemnor. 
The landowner is likely to get much less than the market 
would have provided. The Kahala lessees were remarkably candid 
on this point. Addressing the difference in compensation under the 
act and without the act, they stated that given the "lessees' strong 
desire to own the land under their homes," without eminent domain 
the Bishop Estate would receive "prices much higher than the fair 
market value that would be received by condemnation pursuant to 
the Act. "32 And if the lessees did have to pay the higher price it 
might set off "a social revolution that would irreparably damage 
[the] Bishop Estate and its beneficiaries."33 
One could not ask for more candor from a party. They said 
what they wanted: land. They said how much they wished to pay: 
less than negotiations with the owner would require. And they said 
what would happen if they could not have their way: the small 
number of native Hawaiians would be in for hard times. 
Midkiff is a reverse Robin Hood case. As the lessees argued, 
there could be no "financial killing at the expense of Hawaii's mid-
dle class."34 The "financial killing" will instead be at the expense of 
the Hawaiians (unless, of course, one wishes to ignore the Bishop 
Estate or assume-as the Kahala homeowners did not-that com-
pensation awards will leave the condemnee whole). It is true that 
Midkiff involved only the public use and not the just compensation 
issue, which theoretically could still be resolved fairly. But does 
anyone believe the United States Supreme Court has the time, en-
ergy, or will to police the compensation awards in the thousands of 
eminent domain proceedings that will occur? 
III 
The results in ERG and Midkiff are not particularly surprising. 
Any Court-watcher could have predicted that the Justices would 
not provide constitutional protection for potentially massive natural 
gas price increases. Nor was the Court likely to back away from 
Berman v. Parker. With the outcomes virtually foreordained, the 
interesting question was what the opinions would say. In ERG how 
32. /d. at 29-30. Laurence Tribe was retained to represent the State of Hawaii and was 
prevailing counsel. He did not represent the Kahala homeowners and obviously did not write 
the brief I am quoting. 
33. /d. at 31-32. 
34. /d. at 31. 
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would the Court arrive at the conclusion that obliteration of a con-
tract's most significant provision is not a substantial impairment? 
And in Midkiff how would the victory of the middle class be 
portrayed? 
In ERG the Court simply refused to look at the economics of a 
market transaction. Probably it was transfixed by the assumption 
that any price increase to an energy producer must be a windfall-
by definition. Since the increase would be a windfall, it could not 
have been anticipated. Therefore, despite the bargaining of the par-
ties and the escalators in the contract, it has not been anticipated. 
Or maybe the Court was simply unwilling to budge from its posi-
tion, maintained for three decades, that natural gas prices should 
not rise.3s 
Midkiff is different because the Court must have known who 
the plaintiff was. But it did not inform anyone else. On its facts the 
case is a solid win for formalism over reality. It could hardly have 
been otherwise; given the Court's reluctance to find a forbidden 
"private" purpose behind reallocations of wealth, the facts are 
largely irrelevant. 
Unpleasant facts versus soothing presumptions: this is a battle 
that never ends in the Supreme Court. Examples abound. In cases 
about police brutality toward minorities, most of the Justices re-
fused to concede what everyone knew.36 Juvenile justice,37 criminal 
procedure,Js habeas,39 welfare cases,40 Southern justice in the 
1960's41-almost everywhere the same conflict exists between a ju-
dicial system that formalistically declares certain facts irrelevant 
and one where judges are interested in social reality. 
Returning to where I started, maybe various constitutional 
theories can make these two decisions more acceptable. But I have 
my doubts. In any event, digging into a record and looking at the 
facts of the cases enriches our understanding of constitutional adju-
dication. For my part I'd like to see more of it in the pages of our 
journals. 
35. See Williams, supra note 18. 
36. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 
(1976) (police misconduct). 
37. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967) (juvenile court as neutral friend of the child). 
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (equality of treatment of rich and poor). 
39. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) 
(competency of counsel who fails to make an obvious motion). 
40. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (welfare workers as presumptively interested 
in clients). 
41. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 
384 U.S. 808 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
